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The current film Judas and the Black Messiah depicts the life and death of Fred Hampton, a leader of the Chicago branch of the Black Panther Party (BPP). Hampton was killed on December 4, 1969, in a raid by Chicago police officers on the apartment where he was staying with eight other members of the BPP. At the time, the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois State’s Attorney’s Office claimed the police shootings of Hampton and another Panther killed during the raid were acts of justified self-defense. Subsequent investigation made it abundantly clear that these explanations were false.

 

The Black Panther Party

The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was founded in Oakland, CA, in late 1966, and soon spread to a number of urban areas with large African-American populations. From its beginnings the BPP saw itself as a revolutionary movement that embraced Maoism and, if necessary, armed resistance to local, state, and federal authorities. They regarded racism as endemic to the American socio-political system, and believed that only a total rejection of that system could free African-Americans from its effects. The various BPP chapters stockpiled weapons, often confronted police while armed, and cultivated a militant, paramilitary culture in their ranks. The movement’s rhetoric was often violent, and glorified if not incited anti-police violence.

The BPP’s militantly anti-police posture was very much a response to the all-too widespread police violence against African-American communities. Not simply acts of police brutality and even killing, but also daily acts of harassment and petty humiliation. Coupled with the widespread urban unrest of the 1960s, and rising overall crime rates, tensions between many urban police departments and African-American communities reached the breaking point. As a 1973 independent report on the killing of Fred Hampton described it, there was now an “atmosphere of anger, fear, and mutual hostility…between black Chicagoans and the police.” The report continued:

 That such an atmosphere existed could come as no surprise to
anyone even casually familiar with the state of police-community
relations in black areas of American cities at that time. Chicago’s
experience during the late 1960s may have been especially violent and
tense, but it was fundamentally no different from the situation that
prevailed in almost every major urban center in the country. (Wilkins and Clark, Search and Destroy, 28)

Through their often violent words, and occasional actions, the BPP both reflected this dynamic and contributed to it. Their radical ideology and rhetoric soon made them a major target of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover described the BPP as “without question…the greatest threat to the
internal security of the country [among] violence-prone black-extremist groups.” (Quoted in Wilkins and Clark, Search and Destroy, 11)

At Hoover’s direction, the Panthers soon became one of the top targets of the FBI’s controversial Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Initiated in 1956, expanded starting in 1965, and continued until 1971, COINTELPRO was designed not simply to monitor groups suspected of seeking the violent overthrow of the U.S. government, but sought to actively disrupt and sabotage their operations, through the use of informants and disinformation. The BPP branch in Chicago, established in 1968, soon became a major COINTELPRO focus.

 

The Killing of Fred Hampton

Fred Hampton, eloquent and charismatic, soon emerged as the leader of the BPP in Chicago. While using rhetoric typical of the Panther movement, most of his activities involved non-violent organizing and community outreach efforts. Over the course of 1969, however, a number of violent incidents between Panthers and Chicago police took place, often instigated by the latter. According to a May 1970 federal grand jury report, as a result of these incidents “two police and one Panther were killed; fourteen police and four Panthers were wounded or injured; and there had been over sixty arrests of Panthers for violations ranging from attempted murder and kidnapping to minor traffic violations.” (United States District Court, Report, 12)

The evidence makes clear that, by the time of the December 4th raid, Chicago police saw themselves as at war with the BPP. The raid itself was prompted in part by information provided by the FBI, and facilitated by an FBI informant. Of the nine individuals in the apartment at 2337 W. Monroe Street, Hampton and another Panther, Mark Clark, were killed, and four others were wounded. Two policemen suffered light injuries. The police and state’s attorney insisted that the deaths and injuries were the result of the officers being met with armed resistance while trying to serve a lawful warrant. All seven survivors were charged, with a total of 31 criminal counts between them.

The immediate aftermath of the raid sparked a huge outcry, especially among the African-American community. An estimated 5,000 mourners came to Fred Hampton’s funeral. Almost immediately, the Panthers questioned the official version of events. Evidence soon bore out their complaints. An FBI forensics analysis showed that only one shot was fired by the Panthers at 2337 W. Monroe. By contrast, the police fired as many as 99 rounds. This clearly refuted the claims of a shootout, and the charges against the survivors were soon dismissed. Hampton, who was unconscious and possibly drugged during the raid, was shot four times while laying in bed.

The independent 1973 investigation concluded that:

Every indication is that the raid, contrary to its stated objectives, was
conceived and planned as an armed confrontation with leaders of the
Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party under circumstances in which the planners of the raid knew-or should have known-that loss of life was almost inevitable. (Wilkins and Clark, Search and Destroy, 237-8)

 

The killing of Fred Hampton and the federal/state law enforcement campaign against the BPP reflect a number of strands of American history, including racism, police brutality, and the often violent tumult America experienced during the late 1960s. It also marked perhaps the culmination of the 20th Century countersubversive mindset that saw almost any form of social protest as simply the product of radical subversion, to be suppressed by extralegal and even unconstitutional means if necessary. As civil rights leader Reverend Ralph Abernathy stated at Fred Hampton’s funeral:

If they can do this to the Black Panthers today, who will they do it to
tomorrow? If they succeed in repressing the Black Panthers, it won’t be long
before they crush any party in sight-maybe your party, maybe my party.
(Quoted in Wilkins and Clark, Search and Destroy, 5)

 

 

CWIS Sources:

Black Panther Party. Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session. 1970-71, 4 pts. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4: In 8/15: B 56)

The Black Panther Party: Its Origin and Development as Reflected in its Official Weekly Newspaper The Black Panther, Black Community News Service: Staff Study. Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session. 1970. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4: In 8/15: B 56/2)

Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes: Part 1: Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session. 1974. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4: In 8/15:IN 8/4/PT.1)
-Discusses FBI investigations of alleged domestic subversion, including the BPP.

Extent of Subversion in the New Left, Part 4: Testimony of Charles Siragusa and Ronald L. Brooks: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session. June 10, 1970. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.J 89/2:L 52/3/ PT. 4)
-The witnesses were representatives of the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission. Their testimony includes 10 references to Fred Hampton.

Gun-Barrel Politics, the Black Panther Party, 1966-1971. Report by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session. August 18, 1971. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 1.1/8: 92-470)

Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Part 20: Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Ninety-First Congress, First Session. 1969. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.G 74/6:R 47/PT. 20)
-Focuses on the alleged role of the Black Panthers in fomenting urban unrest. Includes 14 references to Fred Hampton

Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Part 25: Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session. 1970. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.G 74/6:R 47/PT. 25)
-Includes testimony on the Black Panthers and the situation in the south side of Chicago.

 

Additional Federal Government Sources:

FBI FOIA Vault: Black Panther Party.
-“This release consists of Charlotte’s file on BPP activities from 1969 to 1976.”

FBI FOIA Vault: Fred Hampton.
-Contains material on the investigation into Fred Hampton’s killing.

FBI FOIA Vault: Stokely Carmichael.

Intelligence Activities Senate Resolution 21: Vol. 6: Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session. 1975. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.IN 8/17:IN 8/ V. 6)
-Exhaustive investigation into COINTELPRO and other FBI domestic surveillance activities.

National Archives and Records Administration: African American Heritage: Fred Hampton (August 30, 1948 – December 4, 1969)

National Archives and Records Administration: Rediscovering Black History: Fred Hampton: Vanguard Revolutionary. December 4, 2019.

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Report of the January 1970 Grand Jury. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. (Available via Internet Archive)

 

Additional Sources:

Austin, Curtis J. Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2006. (Joyner Stacks: E185.615 .A88 2006; Click here for E-book – ECU users only)

The Black Panthers Speak. ed. Philip S. Foner. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014. (Joyner Stacks: E185.615 .B54646 2014)

Blackstock, Nelson. Cointelpro: The FBI’s Secret War on Political Freedom. New York: Vintage Books, 1976. (Joyner Stacks: HV8141 .B6 1976)

Haas, Jeffrey. The Assassination of Fred Hampton: How the FBI and the Chicago Police Murdered a Black Panther. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2009. (E-book on order)

Seattle Black Panther Party — History and Memory Project:
-Highly detailed historical resource, featuring lengthy narratives, photographs, newspaper articles and other primary documents and oral histories. Includes transcripts and exhibits from the 1971 HCIS hearing into the Seattle-area Panthers. Part of the University of Washington’s Pacific Northwest Labor and Civil Rights Projects.

Taylor, Flint. The Torture Machine: Racism and Police Violence in Chicago. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019. (Joyner Stacks: HV8148 .C42 T39 2019)

Wilkins, Roy and Ramsey Clark. Search And Destroy: A Report by the Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police. New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, 1973. (Available via Internet Archive)
-Independent report on the December 4, 1969 raid in which Hampton was killed.

Williams, Jakobi. From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013. (Joyner Stacks: F548.9 .N4 W55 2013)

As many have noted, the January 6th storming of the U.S. Capitol by a violent right-wing mob was the first successful seizure of the structure since it was taken by the British in 1814. However, it was not the first time that domestic extremists had targeted the capitol building. In 1954, armed Puerto Rican nationalists wounded five members of Congress in a shooting spree. In 1971, the radical left Weather Underground detonated a bomb in a north wing restroom that caused minor damage. Most recently, in 1983, a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group exploded a bomb that caused extensive damage to the Senate side of the building. This incident, though now largely forgotten, was arguably the most destructive domestic terror attack on the U.S. Capitol prior to January 6.

 

The Bombing

On the night of November 7, 1983, just moments after a phone warning was received, a bomb detonated on the second floor of the north (Senate) wing of the capitol. An article on the Senate history website describes the damage:

The force of the device, hidden under a bench at the eastern end of the corridor outside the chamber, blew off the door to the office of Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd. The blast also punched a potentially lethal hole in a wall partition sending a shower of pulverized brick, plaster, and glass into the Republican cloakroom. Although the explosion caused no structural damage to the Capitol, it shattered mirrors, chandeliers, and furniture. Officials calculated damages of $250,000. (Bomb Explodes in Capitol)

There were no casualties. The bombing was claimed by the “Armed Resistance Unit,” as a response to recent American military interventions in Grenada and Lebanon. The name “Armed Resistance Unit,” investigation would reveal, was a cover adopted by a group whose real name was the May 19th Communist Organization.

 

The May 19th Communist Organization

 

In 1978, a radical Marxist-Leninist faction split off from the Weather Underground to form their own group. They called themselves the May 19th Communist Organization, in honor of the mutual birthday of Malcolm X and North Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh. While the May 19th organization was largely white, it did ally itself with radical Black and Puerto Rican groups, even aiding in two 1979 prison escapes. One unique aspect of the group was that it was mostly founded and led by women.

Historian William Rosenau describes the May 19th organization as follows:

They are sort of an offshoot of the Weather Underground, which essentially cracked up in the mid 1980s. These women decided to continue the armed struggle. Many of them had been in the Weather Underground, but they thought the Weather Underground had made important ideological mistakes, that the Weather Underground saw itself as a vanguard of revolution, when in fact the real revolutions were going on in the third world. Or in the United States itself, in places like Puerto Rico or among Native Americans. (Quoted in Thulin, “In the 1980s”)

The capitol bombing was just one of a number of terrorist actions the May 19th organization undertook in order to support Third World revolutionary movements. The group was involved in several armored car robberies, and committed a handful of other bombings in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas. None of the bomb attacks resulted in fatalities, and all followed the same basic script. In Rosenau’s words: “a warning call to clear the area, an explosion, a pre-recorded message to media railing against U.S. imperialism or the war machine under various organizational aliases (never using the name M19).” (Quoted in Thulin, “In the 1980s”)

In the wake of the U.S. Capitol bombing, the group became a major target of FBI counterterrorism efforts. Even as May 19th became ever more radicalized, contemplating both targeted assassinations and no-warning bombings, the group began to break apart under FBI pressure. The first members were arrested in 1985. In 1988, six members of May 19th were charged with the U.S. Capitol attack as well as several other bombings. Three were convicted in 1990.

While the May 19th Communist Organization largely ceased to exist in the mid-1980s, several members remain at-large, and are sought by the FBI to this day.

 

Federal Documents Sources:

Current and Proposed Security Relating to the U.S. Capitol Building and Grounds: Master Plan for the U.S. Capitol Grounds and Related Areas. Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session. November 15, 1983. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.P 96/11:98-52)

Domestic Security Measures Relating to Terrorism. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session. 1984. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.J 89/1:98/51)

FBI Oversight and Budget Authorization. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session. March 14, 1984. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.J 89/2:S.HRG.98-895)

FBI Oversight and Budget Authorization for Fiscal Year 1986. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session. April 3, 1985. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.J 89/2:S.HRG.99-208)

The Weather Underground. Report by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session. January 1975. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.J 89/2:W 37)

 

Additional Sources:

Bomb Explodes in Capitol: November 7, 1983. United States Senate Website.

McGreevy, Nora. “The History of Violent Attacks on the U.S. Capitol.” Smithsonianmag.com, January 8, 2021.

Rosenau, William. Tonight We Bombed the U.S. Capitol: The Explosive Story of M19, America’s First Female Terrorist Group. New York: Atria Books, 2019.  (On Order for Joyner Library)

Thulin, Lila. “In the 1980s, a Far-Left, Female-Led Domestic Terrorism Group Bombed the U.S. Capitol.” Smithsonianmag.com, January 6, 2020.

 

 

In the wake of Russia’s extensive efforts to manipulate American public opinion during the 2016 U. S. presidential election, numerous concerns have been raised about the potential for foreign interference in this year’s election. In the last several months, there have been a number of official warnings regarding foreign attempts at election interference. Most recently, on October 21, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Ratcliffe stated that “we have identified that two foreign actors – Iran and Russia – have taken specific actions to influence public opinion relating to our elections.” (DNI John Ratcliffe’s Remarks)

Here is a brief overview, based on public and private sector sources, of what is publicly known regarding foreign election interference in 2020.

Three Main Threats: Russia, China, and Iran:

The most thorough official overview of the threat posed to the 2020 election by foreign actors came in an August 7 statement by William Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC). Evanina stated that:

Foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures in their attempts to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American people’s confidence in our democratic process. (Statement by NCSC Director)

Evanina announced that the three main adversaries seeking to achieve these ends are China, Russia, and Iran:

We assess that China prefers that President Trump – whom Beijing sees as unpredictable – does not win reelection. China has been expanding its influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States, pressure political figures it views as opposed to China’s interests, and deflect and counter criticism of China.

We assess that Russia is using a range of measures to primarily denigrate former Vice President Biden and what it sees as an anti-Russia “establishment.” This is consistent with Moscow’s public criticism of him when he was Vice President for his role in the Obama Administration’s policies on Ukraine and its support for the anti-Putin opposition inside Russia….Some Kremlin-linked actors are also seeking to boost President Trump’s candidacy on social media and Russian television.

We assess that Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions, President Trump, and to divide the country in advance of the 2020 elections. (Statement by NCSC Director)

Microsoft Warns About “Strontium,” Zirconium,” and “Phosphorus”:

In a September 10 blog post, Microsoft executive Tom Burt stated that three major cyber threat organizations, linked to each of the three nation-states mentioned by Evanina, had been detected:

Strontium, operating from Russia, has attacked more than 200 organizations including political campaigns, advocacy groups, parties and political consultants

Zirconium, operating from China, has attacked high-profile individuals associated with the election, including people associated with the Joe Biden for President campaign and prominent leaders in the international affairs community

Phosphorus, operating from Iran, has continued to attack the personal accounts of people associated with the Donald J. Trump for President campaign (New Cyberattacks)

Burt reported that “Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has observed a series of attacks conducted by Strontium between September 2019 and today,” in order to “harvest people’s log-in credentials or compromise their accounts, presumably to aid in intelligence gathering or disruption operations.” According to Burt, Strontium is the same body “identified in the Mueller report as the organization primary responsible for the attacks on the Democratic presidential campaign in 2016.” This would mean that Strontium is, in fact, Unit 26165 of the GRU, Russian military intelligence. Unit 26165 was also identified as the GRU’s 85th Main Special Service Center in an August 13 NSA/FBI joint press release.

Sanctioning Russian Disinformation Outlets:

Also on September 10, the same day Microsoft released its warning of foreign cyber interference, the Treasury Department announced sanctions against a pro-Russian Ukrainian lawmaker, Andrii Derkach, for actively seeking to influence the 2020 U. S. presidential election. Treasury described Derkach as “an active Russian agent for over a decade, maintaining close connections with the Russian Intelligence Services.” The press release announcing the sanctions discussed his activities as follows:

From at least late 2019 through mid-2020, Derkach waged a covert influence campaign centered on cultivating false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. officials in the upcoming 2020 Presidential Election, spurring corruption investigations in both Ukraine and the United States designed to culminate prior to election day. Derkach’s unsubstantiated narratives were pushed in Western media through coverage of press conferences and other news events, including interviews and statements.

Between May and July 2020, Derkach released edited audio tapes and other unsupported information with the intent to discredit U.S. officials, and he levied unsubstantiated allegations against U.S. and international political figures. Derkach almost certainly targeted the U.S. voting populace, prominent U.S. persons, and members of the U.S. government, based on his reliance on U.S. platforms, English-language documents and videos, and pro-Russian lobbyists in the United States used to propagate his claims. (Treasury Sanctions Russia-Linked)

According to media reports, Derkach’s efforts were directed against Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, and his son Hunter. Among other activities, Derkach has met with President Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, to discuss alleged wrongdoing by Hunter Biden. Along with Derkach, three employees of Russia’s Internet Research Agency, the “troll farm” made notorious by its social media activities in 2016, were likewise sanctioned.

Recent Developments:

In October, the Department of Homeland Security released its first ever Homeland Threat Assessment. This document likewise referenced Russia, China, and Iran as the main foreign threats to this November’s election. The majority of the election assessment portion was devoted to Russia:

Russian online influence actors probably will engage in efforts to discourage voter turnout and to suppress votes in the 2020 U.S. election using methods they have deployed since at least 2016. Before the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian trolls directed messages at specific audiences with false information about the time, manner, or place of voting to suppress votes. Russian influence actors also posed as U.S. persons and discouraged African Americans, Native Americans, and other minority voters from participating in the 2016 election. (Homeland Threat Assessment, 12-13)

In contrast with Director Evanina’s statement, which emphasized the anti-Biden and pro-Trump nature of much of Russia’s efforts, the Homeland Threat Assessment argued that “Moscow’s overarching objective is to undermine the U.S. electoral process and weaken the United States through discord, division, and distraction,” not to aid or oppose any one candidate. This assessment, if true, would contradict not just the overwhelming intelligence community consensus that Russia sought to aid Donald Trump in 2016, but also the evidence of Andrii Derkach’s blatantly anti-Biden efforts and outreach to people around Trump.

Finally, DNI Ratcliffe, in his October 21 statement, noted that “some voter registration information has been obtained by Iran, and separately, by Russia.” This information has apparently been used by the Iranians to send threatening emails to some voters, messages labeled as coming from the radical right-wing Proud Boys movement.

Overall, the 2020 efforts of Russia, China, and Iran have failed to have the same widespread impact that the 2016 active measures campaign waged by Russia’s GRU did. There is certainly still the possibility of greater impact on election day itself, especially if one or more foreign powers are able to hack state election systems, or in the aftermath of a disputed election result. For now, however, it appears that the U. S. government, social media companies, news organizations, and many citizens are much better prepared for foreign disinformation and social media manipulation efforts than they were in 2016.

Previous CWIS Blog Posts on Russian Interference in the 2016 US Elections:

Active Measures (Активные Mероприятия)

The “Neighbors”: The GRU in America, from “Ales” to “Fancy Bear”

“Putin’s Chef” and the “Troll Farm”: Russian Social Media Subversion in 2016

Recent Revelations About “Fancy Bear”: Russia’s Military Hacking Unit

Federal Government Sources on Foreign Election Interference:

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency: Election Infrastructure Security.

DNI John Ratcliffe’s Remarks at Press Conference on Election Security. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 21, 2020.

Federal Bureau of Investigation: Combating Foreign Influence.

Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), September 22, 2020.

Global Engagement Center, U.S. Department of State. GEC Special Report: Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda. August 2020.
-“Provides an overview of Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. The report outlines the five pillars of Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem and how these pillars work together to create a media multiplier effect.”

Homeland Threat Assessment. U. S. Department of Homeland Security, October 2020.

NSA and FBI Expose Russian Previously Undisclosed Malware “Drovorub” in Cybersecurity Advisory. National Security Agency, August 13, 2020.

Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. July 16, 2019.

Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the American Public. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 7, 2020.

Treasury Sanctions Russia-Linked Election Interference Actors. U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 10, 2020.

Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, Second Session. September 17, 2020.
-Features testimony by FBI Director Christopher Wray on foreign threats to the 2020 election.

Other Sources on Foreign Election Interference:

Burt, Tom. “New Cyberattacks Targeting U.S. Elections.” Microsoft.com, September 10, 2020.

Kliman, Daniel, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt and Carisa Nietsche. Dangerous Synergies: Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations. Center for a New American Security, May 7, 2020.

Lamond, James and Jeremy Venook. Blunting Foreign Interference Efforts by Learning the Lessons of the Past. Center for American Progress, September 2, 2020.

On October 15, I offered a virtual presentation on the House Un-American Activities Committee’s (HUAC) 1965-66 investigation of the Ku Klux Klan. This was the only investigation in HUAC’s history to touch upon Greenville, Pitt County, and eastern North Carolina, and involved a topic sadly made relevant by recent events. For those interested, the PowerPoint presentation and a bibliography can be found at the following links:

HUAC vs Greenville Benevolent Association

HUAC-Klan Bibliography

 

On January 27th, I was privileged to present “Accident at Compound 19: Unraveling a Cold War Medical Mystery,” as part of Laupus Library’s Medical History Interest Group series. Here are the slides and bibliography for my presentation:

Sverdlovsk Slides

Sverdlovsk Bibliography

 

In the last several years, the rise of domestic right-wing extremism, in the form of the “alt-right” or white nationalism, has become a major issue in American politics. Events such as the violent “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, VA in August 2017, the October 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue massacre, and the August 2019 racist mass shooting in El Paso, TX prompted congressional committees to hold a number of hearings during 2019 investigating white nationalism and white supremacy.

These recent hearings are not the first occasion in which congressional committees have examined right-wing radicalism. In fact, congressional investigations of the radical right date back to the 1930s, and even helped lead to the creation of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Awareness of this background can help provide a deeper understanding of our current situation.

 

1. The 1930s and 40s

 

 

The rise of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party to power in Germany in 1933 inspired the creation of a number of radical right-wing movements here in the United States. This growth in domestic fascism and right-wing radicalism soon produced what historian Leo Ribuffo has called the “Brown Scare”: an often exaggerated fear of the threat posed by the radical right, in response to the alarming rise of the Third Reich in Europe and the frequently repellent activities of its supporters in the U.S. These concerns reached Congress, where, on March 20, 1934, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 198 (H. Res. 73-2), which created a special committee to investigate:

“The extent, character, and objects of Nazi propaganda activities” in the U.S.; “The diffusion within the United States of subversive propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution”; and “All other questions in relation thereto” (78 CR 4934)

This Special Committee on Un-American Activities disbanded after releasing its report. However, in 1938, the body was reestablished as a continuing committee tasked with investigating “The diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution.” (83 CR 7568) Strengthened by this broader mandate, the committee would investigative both left-wing and right-wing extremism through the end of World War II. Made a standing committee in early 1945, HUAC as it became known soon focused its efforts on exposing real and alleged communist subversion.

Congressional Sources:

Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda, House Report No. 153, 74^th Congress (74-1), Serial Set 9890 (1935)  (Available in U.S. Congressional Serial Set; ECU users only)

Investigation of Nazi Propaganda Activities and Investigation of Certain Other Propaganda Activities. Public Hearings Before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session. 1934-35, 8. v.  (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4: Un 1: N 23)

Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Appendix. Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives. 1940-44, 9 v.  (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.UN 1/2:UN 1/APP)

Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Executive Hearings. Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives. 1939-43, 7 v.  (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.UN 1/2:UN 1/3)

Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Hearings Before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives. 1938-44, 17 v.  (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4.UN 1/2:UN 1)

 

 

2. The 1950s and 60s

 

In the post-World War II period, HUAC mostly confined itself to investigating the Communist Party USA and other perceived sources of left-wing subversion. By the mid 1960s, however, with the civil rights revolution at its height, the committee was prompted to begin an investigation of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).

HUAC began examining the KKK in the spring of 1965. A special subcommittee held public hearings from October 19, 1965 to February 24, 1966, and published a final report in December 1967. The committee found that there were a number of separate Klan organizations in the United States, of which the United Klans of America (UKA) was the largest and most powerful. October 1965 testimony by HUAC investigator Philip Manuel revealed that there were an estimated 112 UKA klaverns (local chapters) in North Carolina, making it, in Manuel’s words, “by far the most active state in terms of Klaverns and membership of the UKA.” (Activities of Ku Klux Klan in the U.S., pt. 1, p. 1553)

Of these 112 local Klan chapters, seven were found in Pitt County. Each of the counties adjacent to Pitt also contained at least one UKA klavern (Lenoir County had five).

Many historians have questioned the impact of HUAC’s investigation in bringing about the demise of the UKA. Scholar David Cunningham has argued, however, that it played an important role in generating negative publicity about the extent of UKA influence in North Carolina, thus prompting authorities in Raleigh to crack down on the organization.

Congressional Sources:

Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States. Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-Ninth Congress, First (-Second) Session. 1965-66, 5 pts. + index  (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 4: Un 1/2: K 95; additional circulating copy in Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4: Un 1/2: K 95)

The Present-Day Ku Klux Klan Movement. Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, First Session. December 11, 1967. (Joyner Docs CWIS: Y 1.1/7: 90-377; additional circulating copy in Joyner NC Stacks: HS2330 .K63 A56)

 

 

3. The 1990s

The 1990s saw a further wave of concern regarding right-wing extremism. The spread of anti-government “militia” movements, in response to tragic incidents at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas, prompted fears of right-wing violence. These fears were magnified after the April 1995 destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, one of the deadliest acts of domestic terrorism in American history.

In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, several congressional committees conducted hearings into the threat posed by right-wing domestic terrorists or by elements of the militia movement.

Congressional Sources:

The Militia Movement in the United States. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session. 1997. (Joyner Docs Stacks:  Y 4.J 89/2:S.HRG.104-804)

Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session. 1996. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.J 89/1:104/51)

Terrorism in the United States: The Nature and Extent of the Threat and Possible Legislative Responses. Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session. 1997. (Joyner Docs Stacks: Y 4.J 89/2:S.HRG.104-757)

 

 

4. 2019 Congressional Committee Hearings on Right-Wing Extremism

Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. May 8,2019.
–Committee Website
-Published Transcript

Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part III): Addressing the Transnational Terrorist Threat. Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. September 20, 2019.
–Committee Website
–Published Transcript

Confronting White Supremacy (Part I): The Consequences of Inaction. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. May 15, 2019.
–Committee Website
–Published Transcript

Confronting White Supremacy (Part II): Adequacy of the Federal Response. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. June 4, 2019.
–Committee Website
–Published Transcript

Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat. Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. September 25, 2019.
–Committee Website
–Published Transcript

Hate Crimes and the Rise of White Nationalism. Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. April 9, 2019.
–Committee Website

Meeting the Challenge of White Nationalist Terrorism at Home and Abroad. Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session. September 18, 2019.
–Committee Website
–Published Transcript

 

Additional Sources:

Belew, Kathleen. Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. (Joyner Stacks: HS2325 .B45 2018)

Churchill, Robert H. To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of the Militia Movement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009. (Joyner Stacks: HN90.R3 C485 2009)

Cunningham, David. Klansville, U.S.A. The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. (Joyner NC Stacks: HS2330 .K63 C75 2013)

Hawley, George. Making Sense of the Alt-Right. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. (Joyner Stacks: E184.A1 H3377 2017)

Neiwert, David. Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump. London: Verso, 2017. (Joyner Stacks: E184.A1 N365 2017)

Ribuffo, Leo P. The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War . Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983. (Joyner Stacks: E806 .R47 1983)

Smith, Geoffrey S. To Save a Nation; American Countersubversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II. New York: Basic Books, 1973. (Joyner Stacks: E806 .S684)

Wade, Wyn Craig. The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. (Joyner Stacks: HS2330.K63 W33 1987)

This post is in support of our current exhibit titled Active Measures (Активные Mероприятия). The exhibit is on display on the First Floor of Joyner Library through the end of September. Feel free to contact David Durant (durantd@ecu.edu) with any questions or comments.

 

A term used to refer to Soviet efforts to influence and manipulate public opinion in other countries during the Cold War, Active Measures has gained a newfound currency in light of the 2016 election influence campaign by Russian intelligence, as well as their overall attempts to shape popular opinion and discourse in the social media environment. This post seeks to put current Russian active measures efforts into a broader historical context.

 

What are Active Measures?

“Our friends in Moscow call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ Our enemies in America call it ‘active measures,’ and I, dear friends, call it ‘my favorite pastime.’”

—Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, Director of Department X, East German foreign intelligence (STASI) (Schoen and Lamb, Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications, 8)

 

According to the authors of a 2017 study, “The term “Active Measures’ came into use in the USSR in the 1950s to describe overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behaviour in foreign countries. Disinformation – the intentional dissemination of false information – is just one of many elements that made up active measures operations.” (Cull, et.al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda, 6) Other techniques included circulating forged documents, false or misleading news stories (“fake news”), and using agents of influence to shape both public opinion and policymaking.

 

The Height of Active Measures

 

During the Cold War, Soviet active measures reached their height during the 1970s and early 1980s. Numerous forgeries and fake news stories were disseminated to influence foreign governments and populations against the United States. Examples include a forged US military document implying American desire to use nuclear weapons on European soil in the event of war; and a forged letter, purportedly from the US Naval Attache in Rome, meant to lend credence to a KGB disinformation story that the US was storing chemical and bacteriological weapons at a base in Naples, Italy.

Most famously, a disinformation campaign begun in 1983 and intensified in 1985 claimed that the AIDS virus had been created in a US biological warfare research facility. Dubbed Operation Denver, the campaign incorporated the efforts of the KGB’s Service A, responsible for active measures efforts, along with their counterparts in the East German Stasi, and other Warsaw Pact secret services.

In a September 7, 1985 message to the Bulgarian intelligence service, the KGB stated that:

We are conducting a series of [active] measures in connection with the appearance in recent years in the USA of a new and dangerous disease, “Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome – AIDS”…, and its subsequent, large-scale spread to other countries, including those in Western Europe. The goal of these measures is to create a favorable opinion for us abroad that this disease is the result of secret experiments with a new type of biological weapon by the secret services of the USA and the Pentagon that spun out of control. (quoted in Selvage and Nehring, Operation “Denver”)

 

Beginning in 1981, the US government began aggressively pushing back against Soviet active measures efforts, bringing to light and debunking numerous Soviet forgeries and disinformation stories. A special interagency Active Measures Working Group, relying heavily on the State Department and the US Information Agency,  was formed for this purpose. It released its first publication, Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations: Soviet Active Measures, in October 1981. By 1986-87, rebutting the AIDS campaign became a special focus for this body. The Soviets began to back away from the AIDS active measures campaign by late 1987, without abandoning it entirely. They also launched new active measures efforts, such as allegations that Latin American children were being abducted and having their organs harvested for the benefit of wealthy Americans in need of an organ transplant.

 

 

The Return of Active Measures

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of active measures seemed to be merely a footnote to history. Under pressure from the United States, the post-Soviet Russian intelligence services abandoned the term “active measures”. However, they remained committed to the general concept, and simply re-dubbed it “support measures.” (Juurvee, The Resurrection of “Active Measures”, 3)

With Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, and the subsequent deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, active measures have reemerged as a key part of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. In particular, the Russian efforts to influence the 2016 American presidential election shows post-Soviet Russia’s continued commitment to active measures, as well as its adaptation of them to the digital age.

As documented in Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s March 2019 report on Russian interference in the 2016 election, the Russians pursued a two-track approach. On the first track, Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, began hacking into email accounts of individuals and organizations affiliated with the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton campaign in March 2016. In July of that year, they used an online cutout to begin sharing the hacked emails with WikiLeaks, who began publishing them later that month. The hacked emails released through WikiLeaks, were, in Mueller’s words, “designed and timed to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign.” (Mueller, Report on the Investigation, 36)

The second track once more involved the spreading of disinformation and “fake news”, in this case through social media via troll and bot accounts. This social media active measures campaign was not conducted directly by the Russian government, but through a private organization called the Internet Research Agency (IRA). Funded by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to Putin, “The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.” (Mueller, Report on the Investigation, 14) The IRA’s widespread use of fake accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram soon saw it dubbed the “troll farm”. As with the GRU’s efforts, the IRA campaign “favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.” (Mueller, Report on the Investigation, 1)

The Russian campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election shows beyond doubt that active measures have returned with a vengeance.

 

The Active Measures exhibit is on display through the end of September. The curator thanks Jennifer Daugherty, Larry Houston, Linnea Vegh, and Layne Carpenter, for all their assistance.

 

Relevant CWIS Blog Posts:

The “Neighbors”: The GRU in America, from “Ales” to “Fancy Bear”

“Putin’s Chef” and the “Troll Farm”: Russian Social Media Subversion in 2016

Recent Revelations About “Fancy Bear”: Russia’s Military Hacking Unit

 

Exhibit Items:

Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations: Soviet Active Measures. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, 1981. (S 1.129:88)

Image shared on social media in 2016 by Russian Internet Research Agency troll account called “Army of Jesus.” Released by Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Senate Intelligence Committee, November 1, 2017. Source: Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Elections Exhibits. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, November 1, 2017.

Mueller, Robert S,, III. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. ʹ600.8(c). March 2019. P. 14.

Soviet Active Measures: An Update. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, 1982. (S 1.129:101) P. 2-3

Soviet Active Measures: Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, July 13, 14, 1982. (Y 4.In 8/18:So 8/5) P. 74-75

Soviet Active Measures: September 1983. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, 1983. (S 1.129:110) P. 4-5

Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session. 1980. (Y 4.In 8/18:So 8/4) P. 136-137

Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87. U.S. Department of State, 1987. (S 1.2:SO 8/12/986-87) P. 79

Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987-1988. U.S. Department of State, 1989. (S 1.2:SO 8/12/987-88) P. 6-7

The U.S.S.R.’s AIDS Disinformation Campaign. U.S. Department of State, 1987. (S 1.126/3:Ac 7)

Usage statistics for the most popular Russian troll accounts on Facebook. Source: Howard, Philip N., Bharath Ganesh, Dimitra Liotsiou, John Kelly & Camille François. “The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018.” Working Paper 2018.2. Oxford, UK: Project on Computational Propaganda. P. 35

 

Additional Sources:

Boghardt, Thomas. “Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign.” Studies in Intelligence 53 (4), December 2009.

Cull, Nicholas J., Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum and Alistair Shawcross. “Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against it. An Analytic History, with Lessons for the Present: Final Report.” LSE Consulting, October 2017.

Jones, Seth G. Russian Meddling in the United States: The Historical Context of the Mueller Report. CSIS Briefs, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 27, 2019.

Juurvee, Ivo. Strategic Analysis April 2018: The resurrection of ‘active measures’: Intelligence services as a part of Russia’s influencing toolbox. Hybrid CoE, May 2, 2018.

Schoen, Fletcher and Christopher J. Lamb. Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012.

Selvage, Douglas and Christopher Nehring. Operation “Denver”: KGB and Stasi Disinformation regarding AIDS. Sources and Methods Blog, Woodrow Wilson Center, July 22, 2019.

The public, redacted version of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller’s report into Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election is now officially available:

Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. ʹ600.8(c)

 

CWIS blog posts relevant to the Russian role in the 2016 US presidential election include:

The “Neighbors”: The GRU in America, from “Ales” to “Fancy Bear”

“Putin’s Chef” and the “Troll Farm”: Russian Social Media Subversion in 2016

Recent Revelations About “Fancy Bear”: Russia’s Military Hacking Unit

 

Much of the discussion around Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election has focused on the manipulation of social media through the use of “bots” and “trolls” to shape American views and online discourse. As Attorney General William P. Barr put it in his March 24 letter to key congressional leaders, this effort:

involved attempts by a Russian organization, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), to conduct disinformation and social media operations in the United States designed to sow social discord, eventually with the aim of interfering with the election. (AG March 24 2019 Letter, 2)

As the country awaits the release of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report in the next few days, it is important to note that previous legal filings and congressional documents have already revealed a great deal about the Russian 2016 social media campaign.

 

“Putin’s Chef”: Yevgeniy Prigozhin and the Internet Research Agency:

 

 

Unlike the much-publicized 2016 hacking of email accounts affiliated with the Democratic party and Hillary Clinton campaign, which was carried out by Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, Russia’s social media disinformation campaign was not the work of an official Russian state agency. Rather, it was a private agency, owned by a Russian oligarch, that unleashed bots and trolls across Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms in order to impact how Americans voted in 2016.

Dubbed the “troll farm”, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), based in St. Petersburg, Russia, was established as a legal corporate entity around July 2013. A February 2018 US Department of Justice press release summarizes the IRA’s activities:

Internet Research Agency allegedly operated through Russian shell companies. It employed hundreds of persons for its online operations, ranging from creators of fictitious personas to technical and administrative support, with an annual budget of millions of dollars. Internet Research Agency was a structured organization headed by a management group and arranged in departments, including graphics, search-engine optimization, information technology, and finance departments. (Grand Jury Indicts)

The driving force behind the IRA is a St. Petersburg-based Russian oligarch named Yevgeniy Prigozhin. Starting as a restaurant owner, Prigozhin has expanded his operations to the point where he holds a number of large Russian government catering contracts, earning him the nickname “Putin’s Chef”.

 

Project Lakhta and the 2016 US Presidential Election:

In 2014, the IRA became part of a broader Prigozhin-financed initiative called Project Lakhta. The purpose of Project Lakhta is to use the Internet and social media to help shape public opinion both inside and outside Russia in accord with the interests of the Russian Federation. These efforts were soon expanded to include the United States. By April 2014, a unit was formed within the IRA called the “translator project”, that concentrated its efforts on American public opinion. According to a February 2018 indictment by the Department of Justice, the translator project “focused on the U.S. population and conducted operations on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.” (United States of America v. Internet Research Agency, 6) In its own words, the IRA existed in part to conduct “information warfare against the United States of America.” (ibid.) By July 2016, over 80 IRA employees were assigned to the translator project.

The employees working in the translator project soon created an extensive number of fake social media accounts, claiming to represent both individuals and organizations. They quickly ramped up their activities in an explicit attempt to influence American public opinion during the 2016 presidential election. These efforts are described in detail in a February 2018 Department of Justice press release:

To hide the Russian origin of their activities, the defendants allegedly purchased space on computer servers located within the United States in order to set up a virtual private network. The defendants allegedly used that infrastructure to establish hundreds of accounts on social media networks such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, making it appear that the accounts were controlled by persons within the United States. They used stolen or fictitious American identities, fraudulent bank accounts, and false identification documents. The defendants posed as politically and socially active Americans, advocating for and against particular political candidates. They established social media pages and groups to communicate with unwitting Americans. They also purchased political advertisements on social media. (Grand Jury Indicts)

Prigozhin was the primary source of funding for the IRA and the other elements of Project Lakhta. From January 2016 to June 2018, the total proposed budget for Project Lakhta was around $35,000,000 (for all operations, not just those targeted at the US). Over $10,000,000 were budgeted for Project Lakhta in the first half of 2018 alone. A St. Petersburg accountant named Elena Khusyaynova oversaw Project Lakhta’s budget.

 

The Extent and Impact of the IRA’s Activity:

Just how extensive, and how effective, were the efforts of Project Lakhta in swaying American voters? While the latter question remains very much in dispute, recent research has revealed that the IRA’s efforts to influence the US public were far wider in scope than first believed. In particular, a pair of reports prepared at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and released in December 2018, have revealed that IRA-created social media content reached tens of millions of Americans between 2014-2017.

According to the first of these reports, from the Computational Propaganda Research Project at the University of Oxford, posts created for IRA-run Facebook accounts were “shared by users just under 31 million times, liked almost 39 million times, reacted to with emojis almost 5.4 million times, and engaged sufficient users to generate almost 3.5 million comments.” (The IRA, Social Media, 6) The 20 most popular IRA Facebook pages received 99% of this usage.

IRA-created Instagram accounts directed at Americans were likewise heavily used. IRA-created Instagram posts “garnered almost 185 million likes and users commented about 4 million times. Forty pages received 99% of all likes.” (Ibid., 7) In all, according to the Oxford researchers, “Over 30 million users, between 2015 and 2017, shared the IRA’s Facebook and Instagram posts with their friends and family, liking, reacting to, and commenting on them along the way.” (Ibid., 3)

According to the second report, produced by a company called New Knowledge, there were 3,841 fake Twitter accounts run by the IRA, which produced some 6,000,000 tweets, leading to 73,000,000 user engagements via that platform.

According to both reports, the IRA’s content was targeted at a number of very specific American demographics from across the political spectrum: African-Americans; conservatives; liberals, especially the LGBT community; Latinos, and Muslim-Americans. While the specific messages tailored to each group varied, all carried a common underlying theme of seeking to exacerbate divisions in American society. In the words of the New Knowledge authors:

The themes selected by the IRA were deployed to create and reinforce tribalism within each targeted community; in a majority of the posts created on a given Page or account, the IRA simply reinforced in-group camaraderie. They punctuated cultural-affinity content with political posts, and content demonizing out-groups. (Tactics & Tropes, 12)

A second major theme both reports agree on is that the IRA’s efforts were clearly intended to help elect Donald Trump. To quote the Oxford report:

What is clear is that all of the messaging clearly sought to benefit the Republican Party—and specifically, Donald Trump. Trump is mentioned most in campaigns targeting conservatives and right-wing voters, where the messaging encouraged these groups to support his campaign. The main groups that could challenge Trump were then provided messaging that sought to confuse, distract, and ultimately discourage members from voting. While the IRA strategy was a long-term one, it is clear that activity between 2015 and 2016 was designed to benefit President Trump’s campaign.
(The IRA, Social Media, 18) (emphasis added)

Not content with seeking to influence the outcome of the 2016 US elections, the Russian social media campaign actually intensified following the vote. IRA usage of Facebook and especially Instagram increased in late 2016-2017. Following on the perceived success of the IRA’s efforts, it is highly likely that Russia and other foreign actors will seek to use social media to manipulate American opinion in future.

 

Previous CWIS Blog Posts on Russian Interference in the 2016 US Elections:

The “Neighbors”: The GRU in America, from “Ales” to “Fancy Bear”

Recent Revelations About “Fancy Bear”: Russia’s Military Hacking Unit

 

Federal Government Sources on the Internet Research Agency:

AG March 24 2019 Letter to House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Committee on the Judiciary, US House of Representatives March 24, 2019.

Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States Political System. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, February 16, 2018.

New Reports Shed Light on Internet Research Agency’s Social Media Tactics. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, December 17, 2018.
-Includes links to the two reports prepared for the SSCI: “The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018”, and “The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency”.

Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms (Company Witnesses): Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session. September 5, 2018.
-Features testimony by Jack Dorsey of Twitter, and Sheryl Sandberg of Facebook.

Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms (Third Party Expert Witnesses): Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session. August 1, 2018.

Open Hearing: Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session. November 1, 2017.
-Includes testimony from representatives of Facebook, Twitter, and Google.

Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian Active Measures, Together with Minority Views. December 31, 2018.

Russian National Charged with Interfering in U.S. Political System. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, October 19, 2018.

Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Elections Exhibits. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, November 1, 2017.

United States of America v. Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova. Department of Justice, September 28, 2018.

United States of America v. Internet Research Agency LLC [and 15 others], Defendants: Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, February 16, 2018.

 

Other Sources on the Internet Research Agency and the 2016 Elections:

Gadde, Vijaya and Yoel Roth. “Enabling Further Research of Information Operations on Twitter.” Twitter.com, October 17, 2018.
-Digital archive of tweets from “3,841 accounts affiliated with the IRA, originating in Russia, and 770 other accounts, potentially originating in Iran. They include more than 10 million Tweets and more than 2 million images, GIFs, videos, and Periscope broadcasts, including the earliest on-Twitter activity from accounts connected with these campaigns, dating back to 2009.”

Itemized Posts and Historical Engagement – 6 Now-Closed FB Pages.
-Archive of posts from Facebook accounts proven to have been created by Russian “trolls” to influence US public opinion. Compiled by Jonathan Albright, of Columbia University’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism

Marshall Fund: Alliance for Securing Democracy.
-Includes both policy analysis, and the Hamilton 68 dashboard for tracking suspected Russian influence activity on Twitter.

Roeder, Oliver. “Why We’re Sharing 3 Million Russian Troll Tweets.” FiveThirtyEight.com, July 31, 2018.
-Digital archive of tweets linked to suspected Russian influence accounts.

Synovitz, Ron. “Facebook Manipulation Echoes Accounts From Russian ‘Troll Factory’.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 7 2017.

#TrollTracker: Twitter Troll Farm Archives. Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic Council, October 17, 2018.

It has been widely reported that the 2016 election-related hacking of email accounts affiliated with the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton campaign was the work of hackers affiliated with Russian military intelligence, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravlenie (GRU), the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff. Known as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 28, or “Fancy Bear”, among other terms, the GRU hacking unit has been one of the world’s most active. A number of recent documents released by the US Department of Justice and several allied governments have provided much greater detail on the GRU’s cyber activities.

 

Unit 26165

A July 13, 2018 indictment returned by a grand jury in the District of Columbia revealed that “Fancy Bear” is, in fact, part of the GRU. Known officially as Unit 26165, the section consists of Russian military intelligence officers trained in hacking and cyberespionage. Beginning in March 2016, Unit 26165 began targeting individuals affiliated with the Clinton campaign and Democratic Party:

In 2016, officials in Unit 26165 began spearphishing volunteers and employees of the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton, including the campaign’s chairman. Through that process, officials in this unit were able to steal the usernames and passwords for numerous individuals and use those credentials to steal email content and hack into other computers. They also were able to hack into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) through these spearphishing techniques to steal emails and documents, covertly monitor the computer activity of dozens of employees, and implant hundreds of files of malicious computer code to steal passwords and maintain access to these networks. (Grand Jury Indicts 12 Russian Intelligence Officers)

According to the indictment, over 300 persons were targeted by Unit 26165 as part of their election-related hacking.

The stolen information was then weaponized as part of what is termed an “active measures” campaign, beginning in June 2016. This part of the operation, which involved releasing the various documents obtained in order to shape public opinion, was conducted by a separate GRU cyber element called Unit 74455. This unit created a website called DC Leaks, as well as a fake online persona called “Guccifer 2.0”, an alleged Romanian hacker who claimed credit for the DNC hack. In July, Guccifer 2.0 passed on the stolen material to WikiLeaks, who began releasing it later that month.

In all, 12 GRU officers were indicted on July 13. Nine of them were members of Unit 26165, including its commanding officer, Viktor Borisovich Netyksho. The other three were members of Unit 74455, including its commander, Colonel Aleksandr Vladimirovich Osadchuk.

 

Other GRU Hacking Operations

The broader scope of Unit 26165’s hacking was revealed by a second American indictment, this one from a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and released on October 4, 2018. This indictment charged seven GRU officers with “computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering.” Five of the seven men indicted were identified as part of Unit 26165, and three of those five had already been indicted in July for election-related hacking:

According to the indictment, beginning in or around December 2014 and continuing until at least May 2018, the conspiracy conducted persistent and sophisticated computer intrusions affecting U.S. persons, corporate entities, international organizations, and their respective employees located around the world, based on their strategic interest to the Russian government.

Among the goals of the conspiracy was to publicize stolen information as part of an influence and disinformation campaign designed to undermine, retaliate against, and otherwise delegitimize the efforts of international anti-doping organizations and officials who had publicly exposed a Russian state-sponsored athlete doping program and to damage the reputations of athletes around the world by falsely claiming that such athletes were using banned or performance-enhancing drugs. (U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers)

Among the specific targets of these GRU cyberespionage efforts were: the World Anti-Doping Agency; the United States Anti-Doping Agency; The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and Westinghouse Electric Company. The international scope of the GRU’s efforts is corroborated by additional information released on October 4 in support of the US indictment, by the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Canada.

 

Previous CWIS Blog Posts on the GRU:

The “Neighbors”: The GRU in America, from “Ales” to “Fancy Bear”

 

Federal Government and Other Primary Sources on Unit 26165:

Documents and Resources from the October 4, 2018 Press Conference. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, October 4, 2018.

Grand Jury Indicts 12 Russian Intelligence Officers for Hacking Offenses Related to the 2016 Election. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, July 13, 2018.

National Security Archive. Cyber Brief: GRU Cyber Operations.
-Collection of unclassified US government documents related to 2016 Russian election-related hacking and active measures.

Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service Disrupts Russian Cyber Operation Targeting OPCW. Netherlands Ministry of Defence, October 4, 2018.

Reckless Campaign of Cyber Attacks by Russian Military intelligence Service Exposed. UK National Cyber Security Centre, October 4, 2018.

U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, October 4, 2018.

U.S. v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al. Department of Justice, October 4, 2018.

U.S. v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho, et al. Department of Justice, July 13, 2018.